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Abstract
Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other’s beliefs. In the current study, we inves-
tigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In 
a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, 
or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other 
agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners 
and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants’ behavior was 
influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human 
and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.
Introduction
To interact in a smooth manner with each other it is impor-
tant that we can infer other people’s intentions and beliefs. 
The human ability to do so has been termed Theory of Mind 
(ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). One of the common 
methods to assess ToM are false belief tasks. These tasks 
were typically developed to test ToM in children. In the 
Sally–Anne task, for example, children watch a scene where 
Sally places an object in a box and then leaves the scene. 
Anne stays in the room and while Sally is gone she puts the 
object in a basket. Children are then asked where Sally will 
look for the object upon reentering the room. The correct 
answer (box) shows that one can predict the behavior of 
Sally by taking into account her (false) beliefs of where the 
object is (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Because participants 
are explicitly asked to reason about someone’s mental state, 
these tasks can be referred to as explicit ToM tasks. More 
recently, spontaneous versions of this task (further called the 
spontaneous ToM task) have been developed (e.g., Senju, 
Southgate, White, Frith, 2009; Kovács, Teglas, Endress, 
2010; Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, Dux, 2011; Schneider, 
Slaughter, Dux, 2017). This research shows that we repre-
sent other’s beliefs even when we are not required to do so 
and other’s mental states are irrelevant to our current goals.
One important and unanswered question is if we sponta-
neously take into account the belief of all other living crea-
tures. In other words, do the beliefs of all others spontane-
ously influence our behavior or is this influence restricted 
to certain others, i.e., others that are more similar to our-
selves? The question of how strongly we are influenced by 
other nonhuman agents has been systematically addressed 
in the domain of joint action, social attention and imitation. 
For example, it has been shown that joint action effects are 
stronger for biological compared to non-biological agents 
(Tsai & Brass, 2007) or that gaze cueing effects are stronger 
when observing humans compared to robots (Wiese, 
Wykowska, Zwickel, Müller, 2012). In addition, these effects 
can be altered by top down influences. For example, when 
priming participants with a video fragment of Pinocchio, 
joint action effects emerged for a wooden hand (Müller 
et al., 2011). Along the same line, gaze cueing effects were 
reduced when a human face was believed to be a mannequin 
and vice versa when a robot was believed to be controlled by 
a human (Wiese et al., 2012).
Finally, research revealed that imitation is sensitive to 
the similarity between the model and the observer: the 
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observation of human actions leads to stronger imitative 
responses than the observation of nonhuman actions (e.g., 
Kilner, Paulignan, Blakemore, 2003; Press, Gillmeister, 
Heyes, 2006; Klapper, Ramsey, Wigboldus, Cross, 2014). 
For instance, Press et al. (2006) presented participants 
with actions performed by a human actor or by a robot. 
Results revealed that an automatic tendency to imi-
tate these actions was present for human as well as for 
robotic agents. Crucially, however, the imitation effect 
was reduced when observing robotic actions. Some stud-
ies report that imitation is also subject to top-down ani-
macy beliefs modulation (e.g., Longo & Berenthal, 2009; 
Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Klapper et al., 2014), but others 
do not (Press et al., 2006). For example, Liepelt & Brass 
(2010) presented participants with movements of a hand 
that was placed in a glove. Participants either believed 
that the hand in the glove was a human hand or a wooden 
hand. The results revealed stronger imitation effects when 
participants believed that a human, compared to a wooden 
hand, executed the movements. On the other had, Press 
et al., (2006) found that imitation was modulated by stimu-
lus properties (human vs. robotic hands) but not by the 
participant’s belief about the animacy of the stimuli.
From this we can conclude, that the more we perceive 
an agent as human-like, based on bottom-up characteristics 
or top down influences, the more the behavior of this other 
agent influences our own behavior. In these domains, how-
ever, it is tested how behaviour of others influence our own 
behaviour. Therefore, it is highly important to investigate the 
boundaries of this belief representational system.
In particular, the question arises whether we spontane-
ously represent beliefs of dissimilar others and specifically, 
of nonhuman agents and whether these representations 
directly influence our own behavior. Interestingly, it has been 
shown that even simple geometric shapes, having pattern 
of contingent movements, elicit the attribution of complex 
internal states, such as intentions and beliefs (Heider & Sim-
mel, 1944; Castelli, Happé, Frith, Frith, 2000), suggesting 
that mental states attribution is not restricted to human-like 
agents. In spontaneous ToM tasks, which measure the effect 
of others’ mental states on our own behavior, representa-
tions of others’ beliefs have been reported in the spontane-
ous ToM task using a smurf as an agent and using Buzz 
Lightyear (a figure from the ‘Toy Story’ movies) as an agent 
(Kovács et al., 2010; Nijhof, Brass, Bardi, Wiersema, 2016; 
Bardi, Desmet, Nijhof, Wiersema, Brass, 2017a). While 
these comic figures are also nonhuman agents, it is very 
likely that we anthropomorphize them (e.g., Epley, Akalis, 
Waytz, Cacioppo, 2008) and we treat them as humans. So 
it remains an open question whether we spontaneously rep-
resent the belief of agents that we ‘perceive’ as humans or 
similar to us or we also represent beliefs of agents that we 
perceive as nonhumans.
To do deal with this issue, in the present work we will use 
a spontaneous ToM task and present an agent that is clearly 
dissimilar to humans, namely a dog. We used an adapted 
version of a spontaneous ToM task (Deschrijver, Bardi, 
Wiersema, Brass,  2016; Nijhof et al., 2016; Bardi et al., 
2017a), originally developed by Kovács et al. (2010). Here, 
participants are presented with a video representing an agent 
who obtains certain knowledge about the location of an 
object, this being either behind an occluder or outside of the 
scene (belief formation phase). At the end of the video, the 
occluder is lowered and participants are requested to press 
a button if the object is present behind the occluder (out-
come). The ball is behind the occluder in 50% of the cases 
(randomly with respect to the belief formation phase). Reac-
tion times depend on the participant expectations: responses 
are faster when the participant expects the object to be pre-
sent (P+ conditions) than when he/she does not (P− con-
ditions). This difference is also referred to as reality-bias 
(Deschrijver et al., 2016; Bardi, Six, Brass, 2017b). More 
strikingly, responses are also shortened when the agent only 
(false belief condition) believes the object is present (P-A+), 
showing that participants’ performance is also influenced by 
the other’s expectations about the presence of the object. The 
difference in RTs when neither the participant nor the agent 
expects the object to be present (P-A−) and the conditions 
in which the agent expects the object to be present (P-A+), 
here referred as ToM index, reflects the pure influence of the 
agent’s belief and is taken as an index of ToM processing 
(Kovács et al., 2010; Deschrijver et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 
2016, Bardi et al., 2017b). Previous neuroimaging studies 
support the idea that the P-A + condition is the critical condi-
tion reflecting belief representation. The TPJ, a key node in 
the “ToM network”, was more active in incongruent trials 
(P−A+, P+A−) than in congruent trials (P−A−, P + A+). 
Importantly, this effect was driven by the P−A + condition 
(Bardi et al., 2017b; Kovács, Kühn, Gergely, Csibra, Brass, 
2014). Moreover, the size of the ToM index was related to 
the symptomatology of autism in a group of individuals with 
the diagnosis of autism (Deschrijver et al., 2016) and in the 
neurotypical population (Nijhof, Brass, Wiersema, 2017).
If we take into account the beliefs of all biological agents, 
we expect that participants’ performance will be influenced 
by the belief of the agent when this is a dog, resulting in a 
significant ToM index. On the contrary, if we do not rep-
resent the belief of a dog, we expect to see a reduced or 
absent ToM index, possibly together with a larger reality 
bias. Second, the use of a dog as the agent in our task, will 
allow us to investigate if the familiarity we have with the 
type of agent, affects the belief representation. More specifi-
cally, we recruited both dog owners and participants that do 
not own a dog and investigate whether they show a different 
pattern of results (Experiment 1). One may hypothesize that 
dog owners, having an extensive interaction with a dog, will 
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perceive a dog as more similar to themselves and, therefore, 
will take into account the beliefs of a dog more strongly 
than participants who do not own a dog. In Experiment 2 we 
directly compared the spontaneous ToM effects when a dog 
is presented as an agent with the case where a human-like 
agent is presented. Finally, in Experiment 3 we investigate 





Thirty-one participants took part in this experiment (six 
males). Fourteen participants were dog owners. They were 
all University students and were paid 10 euros in turn for 
participation. The local ethical committee approved the 
study.
Design and stimuli
Eight different video clips were presented in the experiment. 
They all showed a dog, a rolling ball and an occluder and 
were presented with Presentation software (NeuroBehav-
ioural Systems, Albany, CA, USA). During the first phase 
of the video (the belief formation phase) the participant and 
the agent watch the ball make a trajectory. Dependent on 
the last seen position of the ball the participant expects the 
ball to be behind the occluder or not. Moreover, when the 
ball rolled out of the scene before the occluder was lowered, 
the participant expects the ball to be absent (P−), whereas 
if the ball rolled behind the occluder before it was lowered, 
participants should expect the ball to be present (P+). The 
belief of the agent was manipulated by varying the time at 
which the agent left the scene. When the agent left the scene 
after the ball reached its final position, then the agent has 
a true belief about the ball’s presence (i.e., the same belief 
as the participant). There are two situations in which this 
is the case: both the participant and agent believe that the 
ball is present (P+A+) or both the participant and the agent 
believe that the ball is absent (P−A−). When the agent left 
the scene before the ball reached its final position, then the 
agent has a false belief about the ball’s presence (i.e., a dif-
ferent belief than the participant). Again, two situations can 
occur that match this false belief situation: when the partici-
pant expects the ball to be absent and the agent believes the 
ball to be present (P−A+) and when the participant believes 
the ball to be present and the agent believes the ball to be 
absent (P+A−). During the second phase of the video (out-
come phase), the occluder falls down and in 50% of the cases 
there is a ball (irrespective of what happened in the belief 
formation phase). 8 possible videos were presented resulting 
from a combination of the factors Participant [the partici-
pant expects the ball to be there (P+) or not (P−)] by Agent 
[the agent believes the ball is present (A+) or absent (A−)] 
by Outcome [the ball is present (B+) or absent (B−) at the 
end of the movie]. This combination results in 4 true belief 
videos (P−A−B−, P−A−B+, P+A+B− and P+A+B+) 
and 4 false belief videos (P−A+B−, P−A+B+, P+A−B−, 
P+A−B+). See Fig. 1 for an overview. Every video clip was 
repeated 5 times through the experiment, this resulted in 
40 experimental trials. Before the experiment started, par-
ticipants completed four practice trials. During these trials, 
feedback on participants’ performance was given. Partici-
pants were required to watch the video clips attentively and 
to press a right response button with their right index finger 
(key B of the keyboard) if they detected a ball at the end 
of the video clip. To make sure participants were attentive 
they also had to make a button press when the agent left 
the scene. A left key press was required here (key V of the 
keyboard).
The video clips were generated with a 3D modeling 
software (3D Studio Max 4.2, Autodesk, Discreet). The 
videos were all 18  s long. During the first part of the 
video the belief of the agent was formed (belief forma-
tion phase). All video clips started with a dog letting a 
ball role behind an occluder by pushing its paw against 
it. This lasted 5 s. Moreover, dependent on the condition 
the movies continued as follows: In the P+A+ condition, 
the ball rolls out of the scene and then returns behind the 
occluder (12 s). Then the dog leaves the scene (14 s) and 
reappears. During the absence of the dog, the ball stays 
behind the occluder. This results in a true belief situa-
tion where both the participant and the agent believe the 
ball to be present. In the P−A− condition, the ball rolls 
from behind the occluder then returns behind the occluder 
and finally rolls out of the scene (at 12 s measured from 
the start of the video clip). After this has happened, the 
dog leaves the scene (at 14 s), resulting in a true belief 
situation where both the dog and the participant belief 
the ball to be absent. In the P−A+ condition, the dog 
already leaves the scene while the ball is still behind the 
occluder (8 s). During the absence of the dog, the ball 
rolls from behind the occluder, returns behind the occluder 
and finally leaves the scene (14 s). Then the dog returns. 
This results in a false belief situation where the participant 
believes the ball to be absent, while the dog thinks that the 
ball is present. In the P+A− condition, the ball rolls from 
behind the occluder out of the scene. Then the dog leaves 
the scene (11 s). During the absence of the dog, the ball 
returns behind the occluder (14 s) and then the dog reap-
pears. This results in a false belief situation where the dog 
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believes the ball to be absent and the participant beliefs the 
ball to be present. The final phase of the video clip (out-
come phase) lasted 3 s and was presented in all conditions. 
During this outcome phase the occluder was lowered. In 
50% of the trials a ball was present, in the other half of the 
trials there was no ball. The presence/absence of the ball 
was randomized over the four possible belief conditions.
Results
Two participants were excluded from the further analyses 
(one dog owner and one participant who did not own a dog). 
One of those participants responded too slow (> 2,5 SD’s 
from the mean). The other participant did not understand the 
instructions correctly. Only trials in which a ball appeared 
(50%) were included in the analyses. Further, we excluded 
Fig. 1  Frames of the movies presented during the spontaneous ToM 
task. Frames are shown for the dog task (Experiment 1) and the Buzz 
task (Experiment 2). There were eight conditions, resulting from the 
combination of the expectation of the participant and the belief of the 
Agent (b, c), and outcome phase (d). In the first part of the movie (a), 
the ball rolls behind the screen. In the second part (b), in the presence 
of the agent, the ball can change location or stay behind the occluder. 
In the third part (c) the agent leaves the scene. At this point the ball 
can change its location or not. In the last part (d), the agent comes 




trials in which participants responded before the occluder 
was lowered, or where the response was incorrect (no 
response or multiple responses when the agent left the scene 
or no response or multiple responses when the occluder was 
lowered). This resulted in the exclusion of 1% in the trials 
where a ball appeared.
Two analyses were conducted. First, we tested 
whether the reality bias was present by comparing the 
condition where the participant expected the ball to be 
absent P− [(P−A−) + (P−A+)/2] with the condition 
where the participant expected the ball to be present P+ 
[(P+A−) + (P+A+)/2]. Results show a significant real-
ity bias, t(28) = 3.8, p = 0.001, with detection times in 
the P− conditions being larger than in the P+ conditions 
(P− conditions: M = 381, SD = 82, P+ conditions: M = 352, 
SD = 80). This outcome confirms that participants formu-
lated predictions about the presence of the ball and these 
predictions affect performance.
Second, we tested whether the dog’s belief affected par-
ticipants’ performance and whether belief representation is 
influenced by dog ownership. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
was computed on detection times with the factors Belief 
(P−A− vs. P−A+) and the between variable Ownership 
(dog owner vs. no owner). The two conditions that were 
entered in the ANOVA are the conditions that represent ToM 
processes, namely the condition where the agent believes 
the ball to be present but where the participant does not 
expect the ball (P−A+) and the condition where both the 
agent and the participant do not expect the ball to be pre-
sent (P−A−). Larger detection times in the P−A− condition 
compared to the P−A + condition indicate that participants 
take into account the beliefs of the agent. A positive index 
reflects a representation of the beliefs of the other agent. The 
factor Belief was not significant, F(1,27) = 1.42, p = 0.24, 
η2p = 0.05, indicating that detection times were not affected 
by the belief of the dog (P−A−: M = 387, SD = 92, P−A+: 
M = 374, SD = 84). There was no significant main effect of 
Ownership, F(1,27) = 2.73, p = 0.11, η2p = 0.09. Further, 
there was no significant interaction between Belief and 
Ownership, F(1,27) = 0.81, p = 0.38, η2p = 0.03, indicating 
that there was no difference between the P−A− and P−A+ 
conditions in neither groups. In other words, both dog own-
ers and no owners show a non-significant ToM index (see 
Fig. 2).
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 show that while participants 
take into account their own expectations when carrying out 
the task, the beliefs of the dog do not affect their detec-
tion times. Second, there was no difference in ToM index 
for participants that own a dog and participants that do not 
own a dog. These data suggest that we do not spontaneously 
take into account the belief of a dog. However, this conclu-
sion may be premature since it is based on a null finding. 
Therefore, we conducted a second experiment in which we 
presented a new group of participants with two different ver-
sions of the spontaneous ToM task. One task was identical 
to the one we used in Experiment 1 and showed a dog as an 
agent. The other task was identical to that used in previous 
studies (e.g., Nijhof et al., 2016; Bardi et al., 2017a) and 
showed Buzz Lightyear as the agent. If the conclusion from 
Experiment 1 is warranted, we should obtain a significant 
ToM index in the Buzz Lightyear task but no significant 
ToM index in the dog task. Since dog ownership did not 
influence the data pattern in Experiment 1, we only recruited 
participants that did not own a dog in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Forty-one participants (eight males) participated in this 
experiment. They were all students and were paid 10 euros 
or received course credits in turn for participation. The local 
ethical committee approved the study.
Design and stimuli
We doubled the amount of trials with respect to the previous 
experiment. Instead of 40 trials, every task (one with the dog 
as an agent and one with Buzz Lightyear as an agent) now 
counted 80 trials. The rest of the design was identical to the 
design used in Experiment 1. The stimuli for the task with 




















Fig. 2  Upper panel. Reaction times in experiment 1 for the conditions 
P−A− and P−A + for the group of dog owners and the group of no 
owners. Lower panel. RDI plots of the ToM index in the two groups
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the other task were different. Instead of a dog, Buzz Light-
year appeared as an agent. Further the ball was placed on the 
table by Buzz before it began to roll. However, the different 
events in the movie and their timing were exactly the same 
as in the task with the dog as an agent. The order of the two 
tasks (dog task and Buzz task) was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants performed the two tasks one after 
the other with a few minutes break.
Results
One participant was excluded from further analyses because 
the participant made a lot of premature responses (50% of 
the responses in the Buzz task occurred before the occluder 
was lowered). As in Experiment 1, we only included trials 
in which a ball appeared (50%). Further, we excluded tri-
als in which participants responded before the occluder was 
lowered, or where the response was incorrect (no response 
or multiple responses when the agent left the scene or no 
response or multiple responses when the occluder was low-
ered). This resulted in the exclusion of 3% in the trials where 
a ball appeared.
As in Experiment 1 we first tested whether the partici-
pant’s expectations about the presence of the ball affected 
their detection times. A repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the factors Task (dog vs. Buzz), Participant (P− vs. P+) and 
Order (dog task first vs. Buzz task first) was computed on 
detection times. A main effect of Participant was observed 
(reality bias), indicating that participants were slower when 
they believed the ball to be absent compared to when they 
believed the ball to be present, F(1,38) = 27.55, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.42 (P− conditions: M = 771, SD = 106, P+ condi-
tions: M = 734, SD = 93). There was no main effect of Task, 
F < 1, and no significant interaction between Participant and 
Task, F(1,38) = 2.73, p = 0.11, η2p = 0.07. Explorative simple 
comparisons confirmed that the reality bias was significant 
for both the dog t(39) = 4.03, p = 0.006 (12 ms) and Buzz 
t(39) = 4.03, p < 0.001 (26 ms). A significant interaction 
between Order and Task revealed simple practice effects 
F(1,38) = 5.16, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.12. Participants who per-
formed the dog task first, were slower in the dog than in the 
Buzz task and the reverse was true for the participants who 
started with the Buzz task.
Second, to test for the effect of the agent’s belief on par-
ticipants’ performance, data were analyzed by means of a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors Task (dog vs. 
Buzz), Belief (P−A− vs P−A+) and Order (dog task first 
vs. Buzz task first). We found a significant main effect of 
Belief, F(1,38) = 13.39, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.26, indicating that 
participants responded faster when the agent believed the 
ball would be present compared to when the agent believed 
that the ball would be absent. In line with our hypothesis, 
we observed a significant interaction of Task × Belief, 
F(1,38) = 7.23, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.16. Post hoc t tests, revealed 
that the difference between the P−A− and the P−A+ condi-
tion (i.e., the ToM index) was significant in the Buzz task, 
t(39) = 4.49, p < 0.001 (P−A−: M = 405, SD = 71, P−A+: 
M = 369, SD = 54), but not in the dog task, t < 1 (P−A−: 
M = 386, SD = 68, P−A+: M = 380, SD = 58). A significant 
interaction between Order and Task revealed simple practice 
effects F(1,38) = 7.25, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.16. Participants who 
performed the dog task first, were slower in the dog than in 
the Buzz task and the reverse was true for the participants 
who started with the Buzz task. There was no significant 
main effect of Task, F < 1. See Fig. 3.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 indicate that 
we do not take into account the beliefs of a dog. Here, we 
thus show that spontaneous belief representation is absent 
when confronted with an agent that is not human-like such 
as a dog. In line with research in other domains, such as 
Fig. 3  Detection times in 
experiment 2 and 3 for condi-
tions P−A− and P−A+ for 
the spontaneous ToM task 
displaying Buzz as an agent and 
for the spontaneous ToM task 
displaying a dog as an agent 
(experiments 2 and 3)
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automatic imitation, we thus show that different agents have 
a different influence on our behavior. However, this raises 
the question whether it is possible to introduce a manipula-
tion that induces spontaneous belief representation for a dog. 
Studies on imitation have shown that the amount of attention 
directed to the specific agent can enhance the imitation pro-
cesses (Heyes, 2011). Moreover, it has been recently shown 
that directing participant’s attention towards the location of 
the agent in an implicit perspective-taking task increases the 
effect of the agent’s perspective on performance (Bokowski, 
Hietanen, Samson, 2015). This idea that has its roots in dual-
route models of automatic processes (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, 
Osman, 1990) will be tested here in the context of spontane-
ous belief representation. We included two manipulations to 
increase attention to the nonhuman agent. First of all, before 
the experiment started, we let participants play an interac-
tive ball game on the computer with the dog. In this way, we 
aimed to increase the bond/familiarity between the agent and 
the participant and as such generally increase participants’ 
focus on the dog. Second, we colored the collar of the dog. 
This collar could be blue or red and occasionally subjects 
were asked what color the collar in the previous trial was. In 
this way, they should focus their attention more to the dog 
in each video clip. If attention indeed alters the spontaneous 
representation of beliefs, we should obtain a significant ToM 
index in this third experiment.
Method
Participants
Forty-two participants (24 females) participated in this 
experiment. They were all students from Ghent University 
and were paid 10 euros or gained course credits in turn for 
participation. The local ethic committee approved the study.
Design and stimuli
Participants carried out the spontaneous ToM task with the 
dog as an agent. There were two differences compared to 
the task used in Experiment 2. First, the dog in the video 
clips wore a coloured collar. This collar could be blue (50% 
of the movie clips) or red (50%). Second, to make sure that 
participants paid attention to the agent, we inserted catch 
questions in 20% of the trials. The question was always the 
same namely ‘Does the dog have a blue collar?’. The catch 
questions were randomly inserted and appeared after the end 
of the movie clip. Questions were presented in black text on 
a light grey background for 1000 ms. The words ‘Yes’ and 
‘No’ were presented on the left or right of the screen. 50% 
of the catch questions had ‘Yes’ printed left and ‘No’ right, 
50% vice versa. In this way, responses could not be planned 
in advance. Participants had to respond to the answer on the 
left with their left middle finger (key ‘W’) and to the answer 
on the right with their left index finger (key ‘X’).
Before participants started the spontaneous ToM task, 
they played an interactive ball game with the dog. Partici-
pants were told that they would have to perform a visual 
detection task later but that they first would play a small 
game with the dog. During this ball game, participants saw 
(and heard) a barking dog with a ball placed in front of him. 
Participants were told that when the dog barked, they could 
throw the ball away by pressing the space bar. When par-
ticipants pressed the space bar, the ball rolled away, the dog 
caught the ball and brought it back to the participant. This 
was repeated five times.
Results
Two participants were excluded from further analyses. One 
participant responded too slow (> 2,5 SD’s from the mean), 
the other participant often (> 2,5 SD’s from the mean) 
reacted with more than one button press to the detection of 
the dog and to the detection of the ball. As in the previous 
experiments we only included trials in which a ball appeared 
(50%). Further, we excluded trials in which participants 
responded before the occluder was lowered, or where the 
response was incorrect (no response or multiple responses 
when the agent left the scene or no response or multiple 
responses when the occluder was lowered). This resulted in 
an extra exclusion of 4% in the trials where a ball appeared.
As in the previous two experiments, we analyzed the 
reality bias and the ToM index. A positive reality bias 
was observed, t(39) = 2.42, p = 0.02, showing that par-
ticipants were slower when they expected the ball to be 
absent compared to when they expected the ball to be pre-
sent (P− conditions: M = 770, SD = 116, P+ conditions: 
M = 741, SD = 111). Interestingly, the comparison between 
the P−A− condition and the P−A+ condition (ToM index) 
reached significance, t(39) = 2.05, p = 0.047. In contrast to 
the other experiments, we here observe that the dog’s belief 
affect participants’ detection times. More specifically, when 
the dog believed that the ball would be present behind the 
occluder, responses were faster as compared to when neither 
the agent nor the participants expected the ball to be pre-
sent (P−A−: M = 390, SD = 60; P−A+: M = 379, SD = 60) 
(Fig. 3). Although significant, it should be noted that this 
effect was still significantly smaller with respect to the effect 
obtained with Buzz in experiment 2, t(78) = 8.04, p = 0.009.
Discussion
Previous research indicated that we spontaneously take into 
account the beliefs of other agents (e.g., Kovács et al., 2010; 
Bardi et al., 2017a; Schneider et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 
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2017), even when these beliefs are irrelevant for or current 
tasks. In the present study, we examined the boundaries of 
this spontaneous belief representation system. First of all, 
we investigated if we represent the beliefs of nonhuman-like 
agents, such as dogs. Second, we wanted to see whether 
experience with the type of agent modulates the represen-
tation of the beliefs of this agent. Finally, we examined if 
drawing attention to the agent influences belief represen-
tation. To this aim, we used a spontaneous ToM task and 
instead of a human-like character as agent, we presented 
a dog as agent. Since a dog is clearly nonhuman we could 
investigate if we represent the beliefs of other agents that 
are not human-like. Further, we considered the experience 
people have with such agents by recruiting both dog owners 
and participants that did not own a dog. Finally, in our last 
experiment we investigated the effect of increased attention 
(and increased familiarity with the agent through the initial 
interaction game) to the nonhuman agent by letting partici-
pants play an interactive ball game with the dog and by ask-
ing questions about the color of the collar of the dog. The 
results extracted from these experiments are threefold. First, 
we show that detection times in the spontaneous ToM task 
are not reliably influenced by the beliefs of a dog (Experi-
ment 1 and 2) while they were significantly influenced when 
observing a human-like character (Experiment 2). Second, 
also dog owners did not spontaneously represent the beliefs 
of dogs (Experiment 1). It thus seems that having a dog, 
or having experience with the other agent, does not lead to 
a spontaneous representation of the beliefs of this agent. 
Third, when drawing attention to the dog, and increasing 
the bond between the participant and the dog, beliefs of the 
dog were spontaneously taken into account (Experiment 3). 
In the following sections, we further discuss each outcome, 
underlying the limitations of the current investigation and 
future directions.
Belief representation of nonhuman characters
It thus seems that we do not represent the beliefs of all 
agents that surround us. When observing a dissimilar other, 
such as a dog, the beliefs of this agent do not influence our 
behavior. This null finding cannot be attributed to a lack of 
sensitivity of the task for two reasons. First of all, in all our 
experiments we replicate the reality bias. That is, partici-
pants were slower in the ball detection when they believed 
the ball to be absent compared to when they believe the ball 
to be present. This replicates earlier findings and shows that 
the task is sensitive to the participant’s expectation. Sec-
ond, when Buzz Lightyear was presented as an agent, we 
observed a significant ToM index. That is, participants were 
slower to detect the ball when Buzz believed the ball to be 
absent compared to the situations where Buzz believed the 
ball to be present. As already outlined in the introduction, 
one can argue that we perceive Buzz Lightyear as human-
like and that, therefore, we take into account his beliefs. 
This is likely because, although Buzz is a robot, he has the 
body shape of a human and he is a cartoon character. In line 
with this finding, previous research in the action observa-
tion domain has shown that the more we perceive another 
agent as human-like, the more we represent his/her actions. 
For example, observing a wooden hand after watching a 
video of Pinocchio enhanced motor simulation compared to 
a situation where a control video was shown (Müller et al., 
2011). Here, we show parallel findings in the ToM domain. 
When we observe a nonhuman agent that has human-like 
physical characteristics and can thus be perceived as human, 
we represent the beliefs of this agent. In contrast, when we 
observe a nonhuman agent that is clearly dissimilar from 
us, the beliefs of this nonhuman agent are not spontane-
ously taken into account, or at least to a lesser extent. This 
result may appear surprising because we commonly refer to 
a dog’s mental state using human-like descriptors (e.g., that 
dog loves me, my dog misses me). Moreover, surely dogs 
have beliefs (e.g., their knowledge about objects’ location), 
while robots have not. Here, we can conclude that the physi-
cal properties of the agent might to be the critical factor in 
determining whether, and to which extent, other’s beliefs 
influence our performance in a spontaneous ToM task. 
Future studies should broaden the present results by investi-
gating the specific properties that determine the boundaries 
of belief representation.
Belief representation and experience 
towards the agent
Interestingly, dog ownership did not alter this result. This 
was not in line with our expectations. We hypothesized, 
based on the above reasoning, that the more you observe 
a dog as similar, the more you will take into account his 
beliefs. Previous research has indicated that dog owners 
anthropomorphize their dogs more than no owners (Horow-
itz & Bekoff, 2007), and thus perceive their dogs as more 
similar. Therefore, we expected to obtain an interaction 
between ownership and belief computation, which we did 
not find. This result suggests that even dog owners do not 
represent the beliefs of the dog spontaneously. However, it 
could still be that they represent the beliefs of their own dog 
but that this belief representation does not generalize to the 
category of the agent in general (i.e., dogs in general). More 
importantly, it should be noted that the sample size in the 
two groups was rather limited and, therefore, the outcome of 
experiment 1, with respect to the effect of familiarity, should 
be taken with caution. To test the effect of the experience 




Belief representation and the type of agent
It must be noted that the dog we used in the video clips, is 
a protection dog (Doberman) and is in general perceived as 
rather aggressive. Therefore, it could be that participants 
had a negative feeling towards this dog and, therefore, did 
not represent the beliefs of the dog. It has been demon-
strated that anxiety increases egocentrism and diminishes 
altercentrism in a perspective-taking paradigm that captures 
implicit visual perspective taking (Todd, Forstmann, Burg-
mer, Brooks, Galinsky, 2015; Todd & Simpsons 2016). It 
is, therefore, plausible that participants did not track the dog 
belief because of the anxiety generated by the fact that the 
dog was a Doberman. Furthermore, dogs have a sense of 
smell allowing them to track invisible objects, based on their 
smell. In the context of our task, if participants did attrib-
ute such ability to the dog agent, they could have inferred 
that the dog has tracked the correct location of the ball. In 
other words, the dog never had a false belief, which could 
explain the null finding. This observation calls for a replica-
tion of the previous results with the adoption of a different 
nonhuman-like agent.
Belief representation and attention
In our last experiment, we increased attention towards the 
dog in the video clips by letting participants play an inter-
active ball game with the dog and by asking question about 
the collar of the dog. The results of this last experiment 
show that, indeed, after increasing attention to the agent, 
and familiarity with it, a significant ToM index was observed 
in the spontaneous ToM task. In line with research on the 
automatic imitation effect, this shows that spontaneous 
belief representation can be enhanced when more attention 
is directed to the agent. This result suggests that the main 
difference between the human-like and nonhuman-like agent 
in our task is not our ability to attribute mental states to the 
agents, but rather the degree of attention directed to them. 
Once, we attend to the dog, belief representation mecha-
nisms start operating similarly to the human-like agent. 
Because we implemented two manipulations, one increasing 
the bond between the participant and the dog (the interac-
tion game), and the other increasing attention to the agent 
throughout the task trials (the color task), we cannot know 
whether both added to the effect or if only the interaction 
game or the color task would let the effect emerge. Further 
research should investigate this issue. However, one might 
argue whether belief representation can be really expressed 
in terms of a dichotomy, i.e., either we do represent the oth-
er’s belief or we do not, or it is rather gradually modulated. 
The fact that attention can make the ToM effect to emerge 
suggests that the latter may be true. Here we combined the 
data from the three experiments to reach a much larger 
sample (N = 109) and see whether we would obtain a signifi-
cant ToM index for the dog with that sample. We performed 
a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task (exp. 1, 
2, 3) as between-subject factor and Belief (P−D− versus 
P−D+) as within-subject factor. Results revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of Belief F(1,106) = 4.15, p = 0.03, with a 
small effect size, η2p = 0.04. No interaction between Task and 
Belief was found. The representation of the other’s belief for 
the dog seems to be weak, but consistent.
Spontaneous ToM task
In addition, we further validate the spontaneous ToM task. 
As already stated above, we show a reality bias in all experi-
ments and when using Buzz Lightyear as a character, we 
replicate the previously observed data pattern (Kovács et al., 
2010; Deschrijver et al., 2016). Recently, Philips et al. (2015) 
argued that the observed data pattern in the spontaneous 
ToM task, could be explained by a confound. They argued 
that the data pattern did not reflect ToM processes per se but 
were the result of the attention check. More precisely, the 
authors argued that the button press participants had to make 
when the agent left the scene influenced their reaction times. 
Because the timing of this button press was different for the 
different belief conditions this could have interfered with the 
data. However, here the timing of the button in the different 
conditions was exactly the same for the experiment were 
the dog was shown as an agent as for the experiment where 
Buzz Lightyear was shown as an agent. The only difference 
between these two experiments, was the observed agent. If 
the behavioral effect observed in the spontaneous ToM task 
adopted here would not measure ToM processes but would 
be entirely due to a artifact of the event timing in the movies, 
we would not have observed the current data pattern.
Conclusion
In the current experiments, we show that we do not sponta-
neously represent the beliefs of all other agents. The beliefs 
of nonhuman-like agents, such as dogs, do not strongly 
influence our behavior. Further, experience with the agent 
(as measured by dog ownership), is not sufficient to rep-
resent the beliefs of this agent. However, when attention 
was drawn to the dog shown in the video clips, the beliefs 
of the dog significantly affected participants’ performance. 
Moreover, when combining data from three experiments 
to reach a much larger sample, we observed a significant, 
although small, ToM effects for the dog as well, suggesting 
that whether we represent or not the other’s beliefs is not a 
dichotomy. Rather, in line with what has been previously 
observed for other social phenomena, such as joint actions 
and imitation, spontaneous ToM is strongly reduced, but not 
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completely abolished for nonhuman-like agents. Much more 
research is needed to confirm and extend our results, with 
different kinds of agent and different tasks.
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